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SOME ASPECTS OF ESTATE PLANNING IN TENNESSEE
ALEC BROCK STEVENSON*
Not many years ago a large New York bank circulated privately 4
booklet with the provocative title "The Passing of the Simple Will." The
choice of the title and the text itself underlined the complexities which sur-
round the owner of property and his advisers when they jointly attempt to
plan the disposition of a modern estate for modem needs. The now almost
legendary owner of Blackacre could, indeed, write a simple will, quite effec-
tive and satisfactory as a plan for the disposition 'and use of the family
property. One need scarcely recite the changes which have taken place in more
recent times: the special characteristics of the relatively newer types of
property interests, such as insurance, and the specific legal conditions and
prohibitions which encircle them have received expert attention elsewhere
in this symposium. The estate planner, be he owner or professional con-
sultant, has become a tightrope walker precariously balanced between what
is possible and what is desirable. That which is desirable from the family
standpoint, and may also be legally proper, all too often runs afoul of
federal or state tax law, or both.
This paper has limited objectives. They are (1) to examine a typical
family situation in need of estate planning, proposing one out of many
possible practical solutions, and (2) to assemble and discuss with reference
to the proposed plan a modest selection of Tennessee statutes and cases
illustrating some of the considerations peculiar to Tennessee which the
estate planner in this state must take into account if his plan is to be
workable. Thus these pages do not purport to be a complete treatise on
estate planning and death taxes in Tennessee, certainly not a digest of the
Tennessee law of wills and trusts, and least of all a course of instruction
for Tennessee draftsmen of wills and trust agreements. All these matters are
considered, of course, but, so far as possible, in the way and in the sense
that they may be expected to appear as practical considerations affecting
wills and trusts in day to day experience, whether in the administration,
planning or drafting phases. To save time, familiarity with federal income,
estate and gift taxes is assumed.
For two reasons the hypothetical estate is to be considered as that of a
widow. First, in recent decades there has been a shift of wealth in the United
States which has placed more of it in the hands of women than ever before,
* Vice-President and Trust Officer and Director, The American National Bank of
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though perhaps estate planners and women themselves have not given the
matter enough thought. Second, the widow has no marital deduction prob-
lems, the introduction of which within the space limitations of this article
would complicate matters without adding very much to the value of the
discussion. The attempt is to build upon a factual analysis of a family
situation an effective and economical plan for the preservation, use and trans-
mission of the family property. This means, of course, careful attention
to tax problems, but certainly not an excessive emphasis upon immediate
tax savings.
AN ESTATE PLAN FOR THlE JONES FAMILY
Mr. Jones died in 1946. His widow, now 65, inherited and has just
now gained possession of the fairly substantial estate of her husband. She
has also inherited a set of problems to solve and decisions to make, though
these, to be sure, were not mentioned in Mr. Jones' will. But a separate
letter of advice did contain the suggestion that if Mrs. Jones felt the need of
talking to someone about the management and ultimate disposition of the
family property, she could be sure of a sympathetic hearing and some practi-
cal advice if she would go to Mr. Jones' old personal friend, one of the trust
officers at the bank.
In the conference with the trust officer, the widow Jones is under-
standably at sea to know just where to begin to talk about her' problems.
The main thing is that she -realizes her chances of surviving her husband
for an extremely long period of years are none too good, and somehow, she
has never gotten around to making a will. Her husband's estate has been
added to her own, and the total seems much too large to leave to the mercies
of intestate distribution. Besides she has just recently seen the effect upon
her husband's estate of the voracious estate and inheritance taxes. Perhaps,
she thinks, there are practical ways to meet her problems.
This commonsense approach indicates the necessity for surveying Mvirs.
Jones' assets. After considerable conversation and some leading questions
Mrs. Jones' assets look something like this (excluding personal effects and
other tangible personal property and modest bank balances):
Received from her husband by deed, will or inheritance:
Marketable securities,:,by will .............. $40,000.00
Insurance proceeds ...................... 50,000.00
Home-Mr. Jones' share as tenant by the
entirety, plus her own interest received from
him during his lifetime ................. 30,000.00
Total from husband ................. $120,000.00
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From Mrs. Jones' father:
General power of appointment, exercisable by
will or deed over corpus of trust created by
his will for her benefit; trust situs in
Alabama .............................. $ 50,000.00
From .her own savings, gifts received, etc.' all
marketable securities ..................... 45,000.00
Widow Jones' Gross Investment Assets,
as of today ....................... $215,000.00
With this gross figure in mind, a quick census of the family discloses
the following facts.
Mrs. Jones has two sons, both happily married, the first son 40 years
of age and the second 38. Robert, the oldest, has a son and a daughter, aged
10 and 12 respectively; William and his wife have only one child, a son
aged 9. Mrs. Jones' sons are both in business and enjoying moderate
success, or perhaps very good success, considering the major depression
and major war which have occupied a good part of the years since they
were born. At any rate, Bob is earning about $10,000 a year and Bill
$8,000. Each carries $20,000 of life insurance, and each has received $50,000
outright by the will of his father. Neither of the boys' wives has any estate
of her own. It develops, also, that the widow Jones has no close relatives;
her children and grandchildren are her only concern.
Asked at this point how she would like to leave her own property,
Mrs. Jones says, "Why, leave it share and share alike to, my boys. What
would people think if I did anything else?"
Before answering, Mrs. Jones' adviser suggests a tax computation to
determine how much effectively disposable estate she would have, after
death taxes and expenses, if she were to pass away now. The adviser's
pencilled figures look about like this:
Taxable Disposable
Estate Estate
GROss ASSETS ............................... $215,000 $215,000
Less administration expenses, debts,
accrued taxes, etc ............... $15,000 15,000
Specific federal estate tax exemption 60,000 75,000
Net taxable' estate .................. $140,000 $200,000
Estimated federal estate tax ........ 32,700 32,700
Total effectively disposable estate $167,300
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At this point, if this may be taken as a fairly typical conference, the
obvious thing to do is to carry on the computation on the assumption that
Mrs. Jones dies and leaves this net $167,300'to her sons in equal shares.
Taz Erosion Begins
Since both sons are in about the same financial condition, let us look at
Robert's inheritance of $83,650. But Bob already has $50,000 which he
received from his father, and his estate will also include the proceeds of
$20,000 life insurance, plus, to round out our figures, $11,350 of miscel-
laneous assets, represented by equity in his home, bank accounts and perhaps
a few stocks and bonds. If Mrs. Jones passes away at this time, Bob will
-be faced with the necessity of planning his own $165,000 estate, the aggregate
of the foregoing items. Allowing $60,000 federal estate tax exemption, and a
conservative $5,000 for administration expenses, debts, etc., he is left with
an estate-of $100,000 net, on which the federal tax alone is $20,700. Thus,
Robert's estate of $165,000, gross, works out to $139,300 available for
his wife and children after $25,700 taxes and expenses have been paid.
15% shrinkage is encountered.
Now, if Robert does not get his mother's bequest, what is the result?
His gross estate will be $81,350, taxes and administration expenses about
$4,863, ,and the net available will be $76,487. Deducting this from the
$139,300 of the previous example, Mrs. Jones can be told that if she leaves
Robert outright a net $83,650, and he then dies, his family will only get
$62,813 of it. So that, actually, her bequest will suffer almost a 26% shrink-
age by reason of passing through her son's estate, since it ig subjected to
additional taxes and administration expenses in the process. If the same
thing happens in William's case, then $41,674 (twice the difference between
$83,650 and $62,813) will not be available for Mrs. Jones' daughters-in-law
and grandchildren.
Mrs. Jones' adviser suggests here that two trusts in her will can be
arranged so as to save the damaging second set of taxes and administration
expenses. But, though she responds readily to the idea of saving expenses
and taxes, Mrs. Jones has two objections. First, she dislikes "tying things
up," and especially having to set out so far in advance the detailed provisions
for distribution of income and principal to her grandchildren. She doesn't
know what their characters or needs may be, nor, certainly, how many of
them there will be to share her bounty. And, second, she saw enough of business
hazards during her husband's lifetime to make her desperately anxious to
have the principal of her estate reasonably available for her sons' use,
whether the grandchildren get anything or not.
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Saving the Secmzd Death Tax
Nevertheless, if some way can be found to meet these objections, there
is a worthwhile saving to be had in taxes alone by the use of the trusts.
Robert's federal estate tax on an estate including his present estate plus
$83,650 received outright from his mother would be $20,700, as against
$1,363 on his estate if he were, for example, only the income beneficiary of
a trust composed of the same $83,650 inheritance. So there is a saving to
the family in estate taxes alone of twice the difference between $20,700 and
$1,363, or $38,674.
Such a situation, and it is rather a common one, calls for flexible trust
provisions, among the more important of which would seem to be (1) a
special power of appointment to both Robert and William exercisable by
will only, as to the corpus of the trusts, and, (2) authority in the trustee
(and in the trustee ody) to pay over principal to Robert and William in its
uncontrolled discretion, to enable them to maintain the standard of family
living to which they have been accustomed, and, as well, authority to pay
over principal in cases of emergency. These suggestions meet the widow's
objections and are checked as approved, subject of course, to the opinion
of Mrs. Jones: attorney, whom she will certainly wish to consult.
Meanwhile, aside from the legal questions, it is fairly clear that from
the practical standpoint the rough outline of the estate plan provides cer-
tain definite advantages for Mrs. Jones and her family. First, by reason
of the estate tax savings it preserves a larger portion of Mrs. Jones' estate
for the benefit of all her family than would otherwise be the case. Second,
the recommended special power of appointment (restricted to such classes
of persons as will render the appointment tax-free so far as federal taxes
are concerned) will give Mrs. Jones' sons the power to say in their own
last wills how any remainders in their mother's testamentary trusts are to
be distributed. They may thus take account as often as need be during their
own lives of such special or changed circumstances or needs as might affect
their wives and children. The widow Jones' will, of course, should include'a
saving provision, designating family beneficiaries to take in default of
appointment by Robert and William. Third, the very liberally expressed
power of encroachment granted the trustee has several advantages. To begin
with, it makes funds available to Mrs. Jones' sons if, in the unbiased judg-
ment of an independent party, they are really needed. Second, the funds
paid over are principal, and not income, and hence tax-free. And finally,
sums so paid over do not have to be restricted as to their use solely to the
benefit of Mrs. Jones' sons, but may be used for the benefit of their families
as well.
To complete the picture, it is agreed that the trustee is to have discretion
1949 ]
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as to income from the widow's testamentary trusts, either to accumulate it
or to pay it out from time to time for the benefit of her grandchildren, and
not for her sons who are sufficiently protected by the encroachment provisions.
Thus, all of those in whom Mrs. Jones has the greatest interest will be
taken care of for the duration of the trusts.
Some Income Tax Benefits
There are other incidental gains which the conference brings out, result-
ing from the use of the two family trusts rather than outright bequests by
Mrs. Jones. So long as the bequests are made in trust, and each grandchild
has a separate taxable share, both income and capital gains realized upon
the trust investments will be taxed to the minor beneficiaries or the trusts,
as the case may be, rather than to Mrs. Jones' sons, as would have been
the case had they received their inheritances outright. More tax-splitting is
possible than appears at first sight. In a year in which there are capital
gains in the trusts there may be as many as eight taxpayers. That is, the
taxes could be paid like this: (1) and (2) by the trustee on capital gains
taken in the trusts for Robert's two children, (3) likewise by the trustee in
the trust for William's child, (4), (5) and (6) by the three grandchildren
on inwone from the trusts, and finally, (7) and (8) in joint returns by
Robert and -yife, and by William and wife. As is the case with estate tax,
there are likely to be worthwhile income tax savings also in a carefully
planned trust structure.
If Robert and William received Mrs. Jones' estate outright, or if they
received trust income from her testamentary trusts, the situation would
work out as follows. The sons now enjoy earned incomes of $10,000 and
$8,000, respectively, plus say 4% on their $50,000 inheritances from their
father, or gross incomes of $12;000 and $10,000. Assuming, in Robert's case,
that his wife has no separate income, and the joint return deductions are
$1,000, his gross 'income of $12,000 is taxed on the joint return at $1,575
or 13.1%. William, with only one child, would pay on $10,000 gross a tax
of $1,283 or 12.8%o. If each son had the trust income added to his own
(or received the trust corpus outright and invested it), assuming each
$83,650 trust produced 4%o net, then Robert to get $3,346 additional income
would pay $760 additional tax; that is, the effective rate on the increase
would be 22.8%. William, to get the same amount of additional income,
would pay $735 additional tax or 22%. Roughly speaking, therefore, every
dollar of income paid through the trusts but not given to Mrs. Jones' sons
is worth $1.20 to their families.
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Making Insurance Proceeds Tax-Free -
Meanwhile, Mrs. Jones introduces a new thought. She would" like to
make it possible for both of her sons to increase the amount of life insurance
they are carrying. Neither of them feels able to pay for any more policies.
This suggests the use of gifts during Mrs. Jones' lifetime, but this part of
the discussion is postponed while an examination is made of what may be
done about insurance in Mrs. Jones' will.
Assuming that Robert would like to have at least $30,000 additional
life insurance, on which the premium would be substantial at age forty,
how can it best be bought? It can be acquired for him through the trust
under his mother's will provided the trustee is given power to acquire the
insurance as a trust asset.' Further, it will cost less this way than if the
trust income were paid to him for the purpose of paying premiums, or than
if he received his mother's legacy outright and invested it.
if Mrs. Jones can afford to make gifts by way of paying her sons' life
insurance premiums during her lifetime, that is, to be sure, quite all right.
But even so, there is the problem of whether her sons could carry the policies
after her death. Mrs. Jones can either buy the insurance now, and instruct her
testamentary trustee to pay the premiums after her death, or merely authorize
the trustee after her death to purchase the insurance and pay for it out of
trust income. $1,000 per year paid outright to Robert and William as income
would, in their present tax brackets, cost them around $228 and $193 ad-
ditional tax, respectively, or an aggregate of $421. On the other hand, if the
trustee were authorized to invest income in premiums on insurance on the
lives of the two sons, with death proceeds payable to their families, two im-
portant consequences would accrue.
First, the trustee, and not the sons, would pay income tax on the income
so used. The trustee would only be taxed on income not distributed nor dis-
tributable; that is, only on the income used to buy life insurance, so long .as
remainder of trust income were currently distributed to or used for Mrs.
Jones' grandchildren. Hence, with the regular trustee's income exemption of
$100, only $900 of the insurance premium money would be taxed in the mini-
mum bracket, at 16.60%. Actual annual cost of the $2,000 insurance premiums
for both sons would be $2,298 against $2,421 if the sons bought the insurance
with trust income paid them outright. The yearly saving would pay somewhere
around 1/5 or more of the trustee's annual compensation.
More important, however, upon the death of the sons their families would
receive the insurance proceeds free from estate and inheritance taxes, since
1. There is a Tennessee statute under which fiduciaries may with the approval of
a court of competent jurisdiction invest in insurance, but it is thought by some Tennessee
attorneys to be unsatisfactory in some respects. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 9596.6 (Wil-
liams 1934).
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th6 sons would have had no taxable connection whatever with the policies.2
Further, the proceeds of the policies would go far to replace such amounts
as might have been paid out of trust principal under the encroachment pro-
visions; or, the proceeds might be considered to offset nearly twice over Mrs.
Jones' estate tax of $32,700. At the present ages of Robert and William, 40
and 38, a total of $63,572 ordinary life could be bought for $2,000 per annum.
Finally, using the assumed 4% rate on the trust assets, each trust, after pay-
ing $1,000 annual insurance premiums, would still have about $2,000 net an-
nual income left for the grandchildren, to be used for their education, main-
tenance, etc., until they reached majority.
The grandchildren, of course, are taxable on whatever trust incomes they
receive. Robert's two children will have possible gross incomes of $1,000 each
and be taxable on $400 (after the $600 exemption) at 16.60% for a total tax
of $66.40 each, and their father will lose the benefit of their $1,200 exemp-
tions, which will cost him $474 additional tax, or a total of $596. But this cost
compares with $702 additional tax if he had to take the same $2,000 into his-
own tax return, even though he would retain the benefit of the $1,200 exemp-
tions under those circumstances. The tax benefit is not excessively large but
might easily become so if Robert continues to prosper.
Tax Reduction by Making Gifts
There is still one further matter for tax-saving consideration. Can Mrs.
Jones afford to make gifts during her lifetime and will they be of real benefit
to the family, if made? Of her present $215,000 of assets, the home returns no
cash income. The remaining $185,000 at 4% produces $7,400 per year, on
which Mrs. Jones' income tax (using her exemptions at age 65 of $1,200, and
the $500 standard deduction) is $1,128, leaving a net of $6,272. She has seven
logical donees, the sons, daughters-in-law and the three grandchildren. Seven
gifts of $3,000 each plus a $30,000 gift against her unused lifetime exemption
would be $51,000, the maximum she could dispose of free of federal tax in
1948. But this would mean a gross income loss to her of $2,040 a year and a
net annual loss of $1,565. Besides, the Tennessee gift tax 3 (which now comes
to mind) would take a substantial cut if all seven donees were included in such
a gift, since the total anmual exemption is just $10,000 for gifts to a Class
A donee or donees as a class, and only $5,000 for those to a Class B donee or
donees as a class. The sons and grandchildren (Class A) would get $36,424,
and Mrs. Jones would be taxed $285 on the gift. The balance of $14,575 of
the gift (Class B) would cost Mrs. Jones $478, and the aggregate would be
$763. It seems more desirable to reduce any gift made at this time to an
2. Werthan v. McCabe, 164 Tenn. 611, 51 S. W. 2d 840 (1932).
3. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 1328.1-1328.21 (Williams 1934). Rates are the same as
for the inheritance tax but exemptions differ.
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amount which will escape Tennessee gift tax, and which, at the same time,
will not too seriously lower Mrs. Jones' annual income.
A gift of $51,000 would reduce Mrs. Jones' net income of $6,272 to
$4,707. One would scarcely wish to suggest so large a reduction in income
at one stroke, bearing in mind that the widow's children are well established
in life, and that she herself might outlive her expectancy. But Mrs. Jones is
still thinking about her federal estate taxes, so it remains to examine the, ef-
fect of a $51,000 gift on this impost. After such a gift her net taxable estate
is reduced from $140,000 to $89,000, and the federal tax on it from $32,700
to $16,720, a saving of $15,980. If retained in the trusts under Mrs. Jones'
will this sum would produce about $320 per year for each trust, a benefit
which is outweighed by the effects of the gift on Mrs. Jones' standard of liv-
ing. The trusL officer therefore suggests that Mrs. Jones limit her gifts to
such annual amounts as over a period of 10 or 15 years would aggregate about
$50,000. This would permit annual gifts in the range of some $3,500 to $5,-
000, avoiding by a wide margin any question of either federal or Tennessee
gift taxes, and would noticeably reduce her own federal estate tax in propor-
tion to the number of years she might be able to continue the program.
Ordinarily the trust officer would suggest that Mrs. Jones make a list
of all her invested assets, with their different federal tax bases dependent on
manner of acquisition, in order to select for gifts those which would have the
greatest attraction for the donees from the standpoint of possible capital
gains tax. And he would caution her, too, to be alert for opportunities to
register capital losses for her own account, thereafter making cash gifts of
the proceeds. However, Mrs. Jones' Alabama trust introduces a new set of
questions. Since Curry v. McCanless 4 it has been imprudent (certainly in
Tennessee) to possess a power of appointment over a trust with a situs in
another state, if, that is, you are careless enough to die without having done
your best to protect your estate against the imposition of death taxes by both
the state of domicile and the state where the trust is located. In the case just
cited a Tennessee resident by last will exercised a power of appointment over
the corpus of an Alabama trust, and both states were permitted to tax the
corpus as part of decedent's estate.
Mrs. Jones' unlimited power of appointment may be exercised by will
or deed. She might, of course, effect a tax-free 5 release of the power, but she"
does not like the distribution provisions which her father wrote into the will
to take effect if she did not exercise or only partially exercised the power.
Besides, whatever part of the trust she dies without having appointed will cer-
4. 307 U. S. 357, 59 Sup. Ct. 900, 83 L. Ed. 1339 (1939). For the decision below,
by the Tennessee Supreme Court, see Nashville Trust Co. v. Stokes, 174 Tenn. 1,
118 S. W. 2d 228 (1938).
5. Tax free, that is, so far as federal taxes are concerned. But no one seems to
know exactly what constitutes an effective release so far as Tennessee law-is concerned.
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tainly be taxed in her estate by the Federal Government, Tennessee and Ala-
bama. 6 One solution would be, first, that she should so far as possible make
her gifts to her family by way of amounts of corpus withdrawn from time to
time from the Alabama trust and, second, that her will should appoint what-
ever may be left in the trust to her testamentary trustees. She might be able
in this way to dispose of enough of the Alabama trust before death to make
a substantial reduction in her federal estate tax and, perhaps, to avoid al-
together any tax levy by Alabama. However, this procedure is open to obvious
objections. It would seem more sensible to close out the Alabama trust at one
blow, leaving no loose ends at all, and giving Mrs. Jones immediate and close
control of all her assets. She could then, with a larger fund, make more ad-
vantageous arrangements for investment management during her lifetime,
whether on an agency or revocable trust basis. a
Final decision is to make gifts both direct and by way of purchasing in-
surance on the lives of Robert and William, naming their wives as primary
and their children as secondary beneficiaries. At the boys' present ages gross
premium rates for ordinary life per $1,000 are $32.55 and $30.44, respective-
ly, so Mrs. Jones can, within her proposed annual $5,000 of gifts, easily carry
$30,000 life insurance for each of her sons, and have $3,000 a year left over
for outright gifts.
Mrs. Jones' Plan Summarized
Mrs. Jones' estate plan can now be summarized. As this is a hypothetical
case, we can assume there were no competing trust institutions, and our trust
officer's bank will be named executor and trustee. The residuary trusts are for
the benefit of the boys and their families, with due provisions for the daughters-
in-law, so often forgotten by testators and testatrixes alike. The trustee is to
use trust income to continue to pay the premiums on the life insurance policies
Mrs. Jones has just bought, and may accumulate the balance of income, or pay
it out to or apply it for the benefit of the grandchildren. And the trustee will
have ample authority to use principal by way of payments to Robert and
William if its prudent judgment so dictates. Finally, the two boys will have
special powers of appointment, so limited as to be exercisable free of federal
tax, which they may exercise by will so as to direct ultimate disposition of the
corpus of the two trusts.
So much for the will. Meanwhile, Mrs. Jones has committed herself to a
plan of annual family gifts, so that the scheme as a whole, with ordinary good
fortune, assures substantial estate tax savings, that her family will have the
6. And if her partial exercise of the power was in contemplation of death as
understood by the Tennessee statute, maybe all of the Alabama trust would still be
taxed by Tennessee at Mrs. Jones' death. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 1260(c), 1260(h) (Wil-
liams 1934).
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use of her estate on as favorable a tax basis as can be devised, and that, as a
result of the insurance arrangements, a goodly amount of productive value
otherwise unavoidably lost by tax erosion will eventually be replaced in the
family's hands.
PUTTING THE JONES PLAN INTO EFFECT-CERTAIN LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
At this point matters are ready for Mrs. Jones' attorney. Actually, to be
sure, no one meeting would likely have covered so much ground, and the
probabilities are that the trust officer has long since, with Mrs. Jones' per-
mission, passed along factual memos to her attorney, and has asked his
opinion as to the suggestions so far made. In ordinary course there will fol-
low several meetings in the attorney's office, in which Mrs. Jones and the trust
officer will participate, before the will is finally signed.
In the actual drafting of Mrs. Jones' will, aside from federal tax law
and those aspects of trust law which are more or less common to all states,
there will be a host of legal and tax considerations which her attornev must
take into account, many of them peculiar to Tennessee. No really comprehen-
sive treatment is possible here, but there will be outlined some of the areas
(principally having to do with practical trust and estate administration) in
which experience shows that difficulties have been encountered, and these as a
result either of inadequate language or because the area of trouble was en-
tirely ignored.
Provisions of a will having to do with execution and appointments are
generally regarded as routine matters by attorneys drafting such instruments,
but can nevertheless occasionally cause trouble. However, the Model Execu-
tion of Wills Act was enacted in Tennessee in 1941 and spells outexecution
provisions in detail.7
Co-fiduciary Troubles
As to the appointment of the executor and the trustee two types of dif-
ficulties arise in actual administration. The first usually arises .when co-
executors and co-trustees are appointed and the will does not define the
respective duties and powers of each. Thus, when, as is often the case, the
trust institution is one of the fiduciaries, and unanimous action is required
as is true under Tennessee law,8 there are likely to be occasions when the
co-fiduciary cannot be consulted, and even, perhaps, when one co-fiduciary
may become liable for the act or omission of the other.9 Such difficulties
can only be obviated by language carefully dividing and defining duties and
7. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1941, c. 125; TExN. CODE ANN. §§ 8098.1-8098.9 (Williams 1934).
8. PRITCHARD, WILLS AND EXECUTORS § 510 (2d ed., Sizer, 1928).
9. Deaderick v. Cantrell, 18 Tenn. 263 (1837).
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powers. The second difficulty arises from the fact that, at least until quite
recently, the functions of executor and of trustee were not only held to be
quite distinct but also not to be concurrent in any sense. Thus, it was gener-
ally held that the functions of the trustee could not commence until the trust
property was delivered to him,'0 usually after completion of the administration
of the estate," thus effectively preventing the trustee (even though he was
the same person as the executor) from investing for the benefit of the bene-
ficiaries of, for example, a residuary trust under will. The doctrine was
gradually modified after several exceptions were made in favor of pecuniary
legacies for support and maintenance,' 2 and it has finally become established,
apparently, that income from a residuary trust under will becomes effective
from the date of the testator's death.13 Nevertheless, many attorneys still
prefer to give to the executor and trustee concurrent and coextensive powers
in both capacities.
Tennessee is one of about eight states which by statute always require
bond of a bank or trust company acting as executor or administrator, just
as in the case of an individual, unless the will provides otherwise.1 4 Although
the rates for banks and trust companies making bond in Tennessee are lower
by one-third than those charged individuals, the annual cost for a bank is
substantial and particularly burdensome in a small estate.
Administration-Payment of Debts, Distribution, etc.
There are a number of provisions affecting the administration of the
estate before any trust really comes into operation. While Tennessee laws
allow a testator to dispose of his property in practically any way he chooses,1
the personal representative nevertheless has a duty to pay all lawful debts
and charges before making distribution to legatees, distributees, etc.' 6 And
the assets of the estate are charged with the burden of paying costs of
administration and debts of the decedent, except for such part as may be
10. Nashville & American Trust Co. v. Baxter, 171 Tenn. 494, 105 S. W. 2d 108
(1937) ; Fidelity Trust Co. v. Service Laundry Co., 160 Tenn. 57, 22 S. W. 2d 6 (1929).
11. Cole v. Edwards, 62 S. W. 641 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900).
12. Ensley v. Ensley, 105 Ten. 107, 58 S. W. 288 (1900) ; Harrison v. Henderson,
54 Tenn. 315 (1872); Morgan v. Pope, 47 Tenn. 541 (1870); Darden v. Orgain, 45
Tenn. 212 (1867).
13. American National Bank v. Embry, 181 Tenn. 392, 181 S. W. 2d 356 (1944).
14. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8169 (Williams 1934). But an interested person may suc-
cessfully require bond to be made if he can show the executor is wasting or likely to
waste the estate. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8174 (Williams 1934). For this citation, as well as
for a number of others given in this article and for substantial parts of discussion of
certain details of estate administration, the author is indebted to G. Frank Cole, Jr.,
Vice President and Trust Officer of The American National Bank of Nashville, and
also for permission to use and paraphrase such material from his "The Drafting of Wills
and Trust Agreements in Tennessee," submitted in 1947 in partial fulfillment of the
requirements of The Graduate School of Banking, conducted by the American Bankers
Association at Rutgers University.
15. Smith v. Harrison, 49 Tenn. 230 (1871).
16. PRITCHARD, WILLS AND EXECUTORS § 742 (2d ed., Sizer, 1928).
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specially exempt by law.'7 Nevertheless, it takes a petition in court to sub-
ject real property to the payment of debts of a decedent, even though his
personal property has been exhausted in the process of paying them.'
8
Furthermore, the law specifies an order in which claims and demands against
the estate of a decedent shall have priority,19 and, after that, if the estate is
insufficient after payment of debts and charges to take care of 'all gifts pro-
vided for in the will, there is a specific order to be followed as between
legatees, devisees, heirs and next of kin.20 All of this, however, the testator
may alter by express words or manifest intent, and his draftsman ought to
be particularly careful in expressing such intent if it exists.2 1
Tennessee law does not favor the payment of distributive shares under
the statute in kind, rather than in cash.2 2 An early case indicates this attitude,
and suggests that when a will does not contain trusts testators who do not
wish to see their assets reduced to cash during the administration had best
make provision for discretionary distribution in kind by the personal repre-
sentative.
23
Powers of Sale-Executor and Trustee
In view of the foregoing, express powers, including especially powers'
of sale, when bestowed upon the executor and trustee by the testator, are
of real value in Tennessee. Furthermore, where the powers are extended
to include the power to sell real estate, as well as other property, and to sell
at private as well as at public sale, there is a large gain in maneuverability
and economy.
- The personal representative's power of sale is more firmly established
than that of the trustee, and he may sell decedent's personal property, at
public sale on ten days' notice and, though responsible for the value of the
property, will not be responsible for failure of property to bring its value
if the directions of the statute are followed.2 4 There are many circumstances
under which public sales are not desirable, and ordinarily draftsmen will wish
to provide the power to sell at private sale. As to the trustee's power nothing
is more frustrating than to have to apply to a court of equity 25 in order either
17. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8197 (Williams 1934); Agee v. Saunders, 127 Tenn. 680,
157 S. W. 64 (1913).
18. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1939, c. 175, § 8; TENN. CODE ANN. § 8196.8 (Williams 1934).
19. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1939, c. 175, § 4; TENN. CODE: ANN. § 8196.4 (Williams 1934).
20. PRITCHARD, WILLS AND EXECUTORS § 471 (2d ed., Sizer, 1928).
21. Overton v. Lea, 108 Tenn. 505, 68 S. W. 250 (1902); Morrow v. Morrow, 2
Tenn. Ch. 549 (1875).
22. PRITCHARD, WILLS AND EXECUTORS § 760 (2d ed., Sizer, 1928).
23. Wright's Distributees v. Wright, 8 Tenn. 43 (1827).
24. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8191 (Williams 1934); Johnson v. Kay, 27 Tenn. 142
(1847); PRITCHARD, WILLS AND EXFCUTORS § 702 (2d ed., Sizer, 1928).
25. Weakley v. Barrow, 137 Tenn. 224, 192 S. W. 927 (1916) ; Greenlaw v. Greenlaw.
84 Tenn. 435 (1886).
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to determine that a general power of sale may be implied from the trust
language, or that changed circumstances will warrant approval of a given
sale,26 or whether the purpose 27 for which the property is to be sold is ex-
pressly authorized by the trust instrument.
Miscellaneous Powers
There appears to be no law in Tennessee with respect to the rather im-
portant group of trustee's powers centering around participation in consolida-
tions, mergers, dissolutions, liquidations, reorganizations, etc., with respect
to the trust property. Likewise, there seems to be nothing assuring the
trustee that, if he could so participate, he might accept and retain securities
so issued. Undoubtedly this sort of provision has become more or less routine
in well prepared trust instruments, but the Tennessee practitioner ought not
to overlook that its omission may easily cause administrative difficulties and
even loss.
Although many states have statutes permitting fiduciaries to carry trust
securities in the name of a nominee without showing the name of the trust,
Tennessee has never passed such a statute. Here, again, convenience and
saving in both time and money suggest the use of nominee provisions in all
trust instruments where it is contemplated that the trustee will invest in
stocks and bonds.
Another gap in Tennessee law exists with reference to the authority of
the trustee, without express provision in the trust instrument, to lease real
estate for a time extending beyond the term of the trust. With respect to
leases on farm and residential property, which ordinarily are leased from year
to year, the difficulty is not great. However, business property leases present
another picture, and the trustee who is restricted to a year-to-year or month-
to-month lease on business property, by reason of a careless omission in the
trust instrument, is bound to have to make arrangements damaging to his
income beneficiaries.
In Tennessee, as elsewhere, the power of a trustee to mortgage, pledge
or otherwise encumber the trust property ordinarily depends upon the terms
of his instrument.28 Some cases; however, are on record indicating an implied
power to raise money by mortgage when necessary for the purpose of the
trust.29 And it has been held that a personal representative borrowing money
for the benefit of the estate without authority is entitled to credit if the money
is properly applied.30 But these are poor substitutes for language authorizing
26. Griffith v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 147 Tenn. 224, 246 S. W. 532 (1922).
27. Simmons v. Kincaid, 37 Tenn. 450 (1858).
28. East Tennessee Iron Mfg. Co. v. Gaskell, 70 Tenn. 742 (1879).
29. Harding v. St. Louis Life Ins. Co., 2 Tenn. Ch. 465 (187S).
30. Allen and Hill v. Shanks, 90 Tenn. 359, 16 S. W. 715 (1891). Contra: Cowan
v. Hamilton National Bank, 177 Tenn. 94, 146 S. W. 2d 359 (1941).
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the trustee to borrow for the benefit of the trust estate, such power being
frequently of use in connection with tax settlements and the protection- of
good but non-liquid assets.
Payments to Minors-Encroachments
A minor matter, but one of substantial practical importance from the
standpoint of smooth administration, concerns payment to or for the benefit
of minors or others under legal incapacity. In the absence of specific author-
izing language in the will or trust agreement, it is thought that Tennessee law
would prohibit payment in such cases except to the legally appointed guard-
ians for such persons. The growing concern for the welfare of those nearest
and dearest to the testator would in itself be reason enough for putting
carefully drafted encroachment provisions in a Tennessee trust, aside from
cases on the subject. Encroachment for a particular purpose is construed
literally,31 and particular attention has been paid to the problems of encroach-




While the widow Jones had no business or partnership interests to
protect in her will, there is scarcely an area of estate administration in which
one finds more difficulty than that embracing the operation, liquidation and
conversion of going businesses and paitnerships. If it is desired in Tennessee
to authorize the executor or trustee to continue to operate the testator's
busines5 beyond the reasonable period allowed for disposal, it had best be
done expressly, 33 and the power should be conferred not only on the executor
but also upon the trustee, since forced sales of assets of this type are usually
unfortunate. Further, it usually will be necessary, if the trustee is to continue
an interest in the testator's business that he be given authority to continue
it not only with the funds which were in the business at the time of the
testator's death, but also with additional funds if necessary. 34 In this connec-
tion the borrowing power again becomes important. While there are no
cases in Tennessee on the subject, the modern will and trust having to do
with business interests usually carries a clause empowering the trustee, where
expedient or prudent, to terminate a partnership or proprietorship and in-
corporate it.
31. Green v. Cleveland Bank &-Trust Co., 6 Tenn. App. 685 (W. D. 1928).
32. Stewart v. Hamilton, 151 Tenn. 396, 270 S. W. 79 (1924); Bennett v. Nash-
ville Trust Co., 127 Tenn. 126, 153 S. W. 840 (1912).
33. Wrenne v. American National Bank, 183 Tenn. 247, 191 S. W. 2d 547 (1945);
Morrow v. Morrow, 2 Tenn. Ch. 549 (1875).
34. Morrow v. Morrow, 2 Tenn. Ch. 549 (1875); Brown v. Aydlett, 12 Tenn.
App. 568 (W. D. 1930).
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Tennessed law is noticeably deficient, also, in cases controlling the allo-
catiorf or apportionment by the trustee of receipts and expenses as between
principal and income, immediate and ultimate beneficiaries. The cases in
other states and the Uniform Principal and Income Act are warning enough
that a great deal of expense and bother can be avoided by clear provisions on
these matters.
Investment Provisions
The investment provisions of a Tennessee trust need, under present
conditions, a considerable amount of care in draftsmanship. Giving expression
to the growing interest of testators of means in forms of investment not
authorized by the Tennessee statute requires specific language. Tennessee
is one of the "legal" states, although two characteristics of the Tennessee
trust investment statute35 must be noted. First, the permitted trust invest-
ments are governed by a legal standard, and not by a legal list issued by an
agent or agency of the state government. Certain classes of securities are de-
scribed in detail, and the tests set up which must be met before an individual se-
curity will come within the permitted class. Generally speaking, investments
permitted by the statute include bonds of the United States Government and its
instrumentalities; bonds of foreign governments and their political sub-
divisions; state, city and county bonds of the United States; first mortgages;
certain railroad, telephone and gas and electric bonds. The only stocks per-
mitted are shares in savings and loan associations insured under a certain
act of Congress.
The second characteristic of the Tennessee statute is that it is permissive
and not mandatory.36 The cases so holding are said by some to afford con-
siderable comfort to those who believe that, the statute being permissive only,
the real trust investment rule in Tennessee is the Prudent Man Rule. Others
are of the opinion that so long as the trust investment statute stays on the
books it is obvious that the trustee complying with the statute (failing other
authority in his trust instrument) is bound to be in a better position than
one who goes outside the statute. Most draftsmen in Tennessee appear to
prefer to refer specifically to the Prudent Man Rule if the testator or trustor
wishes a liberal investment policy, or to use other language indicating clearly the
trustee's authority to go outside of the classes of securities set out in the
statute. It would seem to go without saying that it would be safer to include
in an investment clause of generally liberal authority explanatory language
illustrating but not limiting the trustee's authority, and specifically granting
35. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 9596.1-9596.11 (Williams 1934).
36. Steinberg v. Cox, 24 Tenn. App. 340, 144 S. W. 2d 12 (W. D. 1939); Falls v.
Carruthers, 20 Tenn. App. 681, 103 S. W. 2d 605 (W. D. 1936); Gibson County v.
Fourth & First Nat. Bank, 20 Tenn. App. 168, 96 S. W. 2d 184 (M. D. 1936).
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power to invest in common stocks, real estate, common trust funds, invest-
ment companies and other forms of proved investments, etc., wherever, as
is almost always the case, the testator or trustor is a person of sufficient
wealth to have become familiar with these highly useful forms of investment.
A kindred question is that concerning the continuation or retention of
so-called "original" investments; that is, those coming into the hands of the
executor or trustee from the decedent himself. The executor, of course, is
allowed a reasonable time within which to sell investments coming into his
hands as assets of the estate,37 and even if they are not proper investments,
the same is true of the trustee. As a matter of statute law, so far as the trustee
is concerned nothing specific on the question appeared until 1945 in Ten-
nessee when a public act 3 8 was passed, allowing a fiduciary to make applica-
tion to chancery court or to any other court of concurrent jurisdiction "for
permission to retain and hold in unchanged form any security or investment
originally forming a part of the estate."
While the power thus granted is useful, it would be even better if the
will or trust agreement contained the power to retain originals in the first
place. All the more importance should attach to a provision empowering the
executor and trustee, if such should be a bank or trust institution, to retain
its own stock if in fact the testator or trustor desired this to be done. Ob-
viously, the hazard to the institution in so doing without express authority
is substantial.
While it is more properly an administrative matter, mention should be
made here of the fact that there is no Tennessee law on the subject of the
handling of premiums and discounts on trust investments. It is believed that
most Tennessee trust institutions amortize premiums (but not discounts)
unless otherwise instructed in the will or trust agreement, and that this is in
accord with practice in most of the states in which no law or statute exists.
Nevertheless, many testators and trustors are not even aware of what
amortization is, though when it is called to their attention the majority of
them will wish to have written in a provision excusing the trustee from
amortizing premiums, but giving him authority to amortize them when and if
in his judgment it is prudent so to do.
The treatment of stock dividends where securities are held in trust in
Tennessee is governed, so far as can be determined, by one reported case. 39
This appears to commit Tennessee to following the Pennsylvania Rule,
under which stock dividends and special or extraordinary dividends as well
are distributable to the life beneficiary to the extent that the earnings out of
37. Pearson v. Gillenwaters, 99 Tenn. 446, 42 S. W. 9 (1897).
38. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1945, c. 53; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 9596.9-9596.11 (Williams
1934).
39. Pritchitt v. Nashville Trust Co., 96 Tenn. 472, 36 S. W. 1064 (1896).
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which the dividends were declared and paid were accumulated during the
life of the trust. It is submitted here that slavish devotion either to the
Massachusetts or to the Pennsylvania Rule may result in substantial in-
6quities. The tendency in today's wills and trust agreements in Tennessee
is to give the trustee a rather wide authority to determine the allocation or
apportionment of stock and extraordinary dividends, but to suggest to him
that, in general, stock dividends taxable for federal income tax purposes be
distributed as income, and the others retained as corpus.
Tax Provisions
As to taxes, it has been usual in Tennessee to insert in a will a clause
directing the executor to pay estate, inheritance and succession taxes out
of the "general estate before distribution and not to apportion same among
the several beneficiaries." This type of provision has been held to result in
a charge of the taxes to undevised realty and personalty.40 As a rule, this is
proper, but the fact suggests that extreme caution be used to avoid the possi-
bility that the residuary estate (usually that part devoted to those closest
to the testator) may be so depleted by the payment of taxes on outright
devises and bequests not a part thereof that real damage will be done.
The Tennessee statute places the liability for the payment of the inherit-
ance tax on the personal representative regardless of the ultimate beneficial
interest,4 ' but the tax is a tax upon the privilege of receiving an estate or
interest,42 while the federal estate tax is imposed upon the privilege of
giving or transmitting property at death. In short, the Tennessee inheritance
tax, although it is payable by the personal representative, is the obligation
of the recipient and may be recovered by the personal representative from
such recipient as beneficiary.
As to the federal estate tax, it is there provided that, unless otherwise
directed by the will, it is to be prorated equitably among beneficiaries and
persons interested in the estate. Accordingly, both the inheritance tax and the
federal estate tax are in practice payable by the personal representative who
has no choice except to prorate them unless otherwise directed.
Spendthrift Trusts
Tennessee is one of the states in which the law with respect to spend-
thrift trusts and restraints on alienation in general is relatively liberal. It is
true, though, that the law does not go so far as to make possible the adoption
40. Nashville Trust Co. v. Grimes, 179 Tenn. 567, 167 S. W. 2d 994 (1943).
41. TENN. CODE ANN. § 1292 (Williams 1934).
42. Hutchisdn v. Montgomery, 172 Tenn. 375, 112 S. W. 2d 827 (1938); State
ex rel. McCabe v. Clayton, 162 Tenn. 368, 38 S. W. 2d 551 (1931); English v.
Crenshaw, 120 Tenn. 531, 110 S. W. 210 (1908).
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of Shattuck's suggestion that a revocable trust in which the grantor reserves
an interest for himself may afford a shelter either against his creditors or
those of his beneficiaries when he shall die.43
The cases in general hold that it is not against public policy to create
spendthrift trusts for the protection of improvident or unfortunate benefi-
ciaries, that actual language "excluding the rights of creditors" is not neces-
sary,44 that a trust for "support and maintenance" of a beneficiary where
the trust is active is not subject to levy of execution.
4 5
In White v. O'Bryan 40 it is stated that a trust sufficient to withstand the
attack of a creditor under 'a bill in the chancery court must contain these
elements: (1) it must be created by some person other than the beneficiary;
(2) it must be an active trust; (3) it must be declared by will duly recorded,
or deed duly registered. It is further stated that a chancery decree creating
a trust is not sufficient, since it does not comply with the third requirement 4 7
The Tennessee Constitution prohibits perpetuities. 48 However, the law
permits transfers which "must pass in interest, if at all, within a life or lives
in being and twenty-one years and a fraction thereafter for the term of
gestation in cases of posthtmous births." 49 Nor is the rule "offended if an
estate begins within the limits of the rule regardless of' the time at which
such an estate may end." 50
The question of accumulations is closely allied with that of perpetuities,
but in Tennessee accumulations are permitted. "The rule is that a trustee may
pay over the income to the cestui que trust as the same is received unless the
instrument creating the trust especially directs the accumulation of the
income." 51
THE TENNESSEE INHERITANCE TAX
In order to avoid slowing the narrative, no account was taken of the
Tennessee inheritance .and estate taxes in calculating tax effect on the widow
43. Menken Co. v. Brinkley, 94 Tenn. 721, -31 S. W. 92 (1895); Rose v. Third
Nat. Bank, 27 Tenn. App. 553, 183 S. W. 2d 1 (M. D. 1944).
44. Mayberry v. Redmond, 169 Tenn. 190, 83 S. W. 2d 897 (1935).
45. Henson v. Wright, 88 Tenn. 501, 12 S. W. 1035 (1890); Jourolmon v. Mas-
sengill, 86 Tenn. 81, 5 S. W. 719 (1887).
46. 148 Tenn. 18, 251 S. W. 785 (1922).
47. For a thorough discussion of Tennessee law as to spendthrift trusts and other
trust law, see Malone. Distinctive Features of the Tennessee Law of Trusts, 16 TENN.
L. REv. 33 (1939). For further cases on the subject, see Shelton v. King,. 229 U. S. 90,
33 Sup. Ct. 686, 57 L. Ed. 1086 (1913); Stier v. Nashville Trust Co., 1580Fed. 601
(C. C. A. 6th 1908); Keeling v. Keeling, 185 Tenn. 134, 203 S. W. 2d 601 (1947);
Porter v. Lee, 88 Tenn. 782, 14 S. W. 218 (1890) ; Turley v. Massengill, 75 Tenn. 353
(1881); Mills v. Mills, 40 Tenn. 706 (1859); State v. Nashville Trust Co., 28 Tenn.
App. 388, 190 S. W. 785 (M. D. 1944); Davis v. Mitchell, 27 Tenn. App. 182, 178 S. W.
2d 889 (W. D. 1943); Patton v. Winters, 20 Tenn. App. 600, 101 S. W. 2d 708 (M.
D. 1936).
48. TENN. CONsT. Art. I, § 22 (1870).
49. Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 151 Tenn. 221, 231, 269 S. W. 36, 39 (1924) ; Eager
v. McCoy, 143 Tenn. 693, 702, 228 S. W. 709, 711 (1920).
50. Eager v. McCoy, 143 Tenn. 693, 703, 228 S. W. 709, 711 (1920).
51. Godsey v. Lenderson, 9 Tenn. App. 580, 585 (W. D. 1929).
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Jones' estate. The Tennessee estate tax 52 is, as is the case in many other
states, primarily designed to absorb the federal estate tax credit. The inherit-
ance tax itself,53 while the rates are not excessive, does play some part in
estate planning.
The rates of tax are shown in the statute as follows:
Class A
1% on amounts from $10,000.00 to $25,000.00
1 o% on the next $25,000.00 or part thereof
3% on the next $50,000.00 or part thereof
4% on the next $200,000.00 or part thereof
5% on the next $200,000.00 or part thereof
7% on the excess over $500,000.00 or part thereof.
Class B
5% on amounts from $1,000.00 to $50,000.00
7% on the next $50,000.00 or part thereof
9% on the next $50,000.00 or part thereof
10% on the next $50,000.00 or part thereof
12% on the next $50,000.00 or part thereof
15% on the excess over $250,000.00 or part thereof
We calculated Mrs. Jones' federal estate tax at $32,700 on a gross
estate of $215,000. For Tennessee inheritance tax purposes her taxable estate
is $190,000; that is, $215,000 less the administration expenses, debts, etc., of
$15,000 and less the $10,000 specific exemption allowed her by the state
statute. On this $190,000 her gross Tennessee inheritance tax is $5,625.
Upon computing 80% credit for the State of Tennessee tax against the basic
federal estate tax under (Federal) Section 810, a credit of $1,200 is obtained.
In Mrs. Jones' case the Tennessee tax is not inconsiderable, but still so much
smaller than the federal tax that there would be no sense in changing provi-
sions satisfactory for federal tax purposes in order to save on the Tennessee
tax. Actually, except to leave substantial gifts to charity, etc., there is little
Mrs. Jones can do to lessen the Tennessee tax burden. It is clear from the
rate table, though, that Tennessee residents are given a strong incentive to
transmit their estates to Class A beneficiaries.
Since the major differences between the Tennessee inheritance tax and
the federal estate tax are treated elsewhere in this issue 54 no further attempt
52. TaEN. CODE ANN. §§ 1296-1315 (Williams 1934).
53. Id. §§ 1259-95.
54. Note, Tennessee Death Taxes, 2 VAND. L. REv. 294 (1949).
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will be made here to consider the characteristics of the Tennessee tax or to deal
with any of the legal problems created by it.
CONCLUSION
These pages have but briefly outlined some of the areas of the Tennessee
law of estate and gift taxation, and of the Tennessee law of wills and trusts
in which estate planners are most often likely to find themselves when the
time comes to reduce to system the unplanned family property aggregate.
It is, of course, the prerogative of the family lawyer to draft from memoranda
of facts and personal desires an instrument which, as he will certainly take
into account all of the legal matters here discussed and many more besides,
is the final valid and effective embodiment of a sound estate plan. No layman
would wish to be thought to be instructing lawyers about estate planning.
But in the recent development of the art the lawyer more and more finds
himself working with a team which includes at least three lay members-
the tax consultant, the trust officer and the life underwriter. They can teach
the lawyer no law. But to the extent that he is willing to inform them as he
works with ihem, he is less likely to be asked to do the legally impossible,
and therefore more apt to have presented to him the outline of a plan that
is both legally proper and practically workable.
1948)
